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Industry level analysis: the way to identify the binding 
constraints to economic growth 
 
Vincent Palmade*/  
 
Abstract: There are many economic diagnostic tools available which are trying to 
identify the constraints to economic growth in a given country. Unfortunately these 
tools tend to provide inconclusive and often conflicting answers as to what the most 
important constraints are.  Even more worrisome, they tend to overlook the many 
industry specific policy and enforcement issues which, collectively, have been 
found to be the most important constraints to economic growth.  This is the key 
finding from more than ten years of economic research by the McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI). The MGI country studies have been uniquely based on the in-depth 
analysis of a representative sample of industries where clear causality links could be 
established between factors in the firms’ external environment and their behavior, in 
particular through the analysis of competitive dynamics. They showed in details 
how industry specific policy and enforcement issues were the main constraints to  
private investment and fair competition – the two drivers of productivity and thus 
economic growth.  This finding implies that governments and international financial 
institutions should rely much more on in-depth industry level analysis to uncover 
product market competition issues and set reform priorities.  These analyses should 
include the often overlooked but critically important domestic service sectors such 
as retail and housing construction.       
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•P r i v a t i z a t i o n
• Flexible labor and capital markets
• Infrastructure
•E d u c a t i o n
• Low tariffs
Figure 2.  Main Finding of MGI Studies
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INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This short paper synthesizes the key findings and methodology of the McKinsey 
Global Institute (MGI) as they relate to developing countries. The views expressed 
in this paper are solely mine while most of the facts are from MGI studies. 
Since 1990, the MGI has conducted 17 studies of developed and developing 
countries, spanning 28 economic sectors (Figure 1). All the MGI studies are entirely 
financed by McKinsey and can be accessed fully and freely at mckinsey.com/mgi. 
The Power of Productivity, by William Lewis, the founding Director of MGI 
between 1990 and 2001, also synthesizes the results. The work of the Institute 
continues under the leadership of Diana Farrell, Director since 2002. 
One country study typically took a year for a full-time research team of 10 people, 
and required more than 400 in-depth company interviews.  The findings have been 
extensively reviewed by world-class economists to ensure that the fact base and 
economic reasoning met the highest academic standards. Robert Solow chaired a 
majority of the Institute’s Academic Advisory Committees.  Olivier Blanchard, 
Martin Baily, Dick Cooper, Dani Rodrik, Montek Ahluwalia and Leszek 
Balcerovicz  also made important contributions.   
The first section of this paper presents the findings and the second presents the 
methodology used in the studies.   
I. PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION: THE ENGINE OF GROWTH  
Good macroeconomic policies, particularly fiscal discipline and private ownership, 
are necessary but not sufficient conditions for strong economic performance.  Now 
that most developing countries have made significant progress on macroeconomic 
stabilization and privatization, MGI found that micro policy issues affecting product 
market competition are collectively the most significant impediments to faster 
economic growth.  Unfortunately, most of the public debates and the governments’ 
energy remain too centered on macroeconomic policies, distortions in the capital 
and labor markets, lack of labor skills and infrastructure (Figure 2).   
Micro policy issues, e.g., restrictions to foreign direct investment or unequal 
enforcement of taxes between formal and informal players, have been found to be 
critical because they determine the level and fairness of competition.  Competitive 
pressure is what forces managers to get their company to its productivity potential - 
a result also obtained by the Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank.  In 
fact, the studies showed that most managers are not profit maximizers (increasing 













Figure 3.  Results from India Study
GDP growth, CAGR
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Figure 4.  Comparison of Sector Productivities in India
Productivity, U.S. = 100
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Competitive pressure moves up and down value chains through sector linkages:  
retailers influence the performance of wholesalers and food processors which in 
turn drive the performance of the agriculture sector (e.g. contract farming), call 
centers require a high performing telecom industry, real estate developers influence 
the performance of the construction material industry and vice versa.   
Product market competition is the main capital allocation mechanism – retained 
earnings are in most countries the main source of financing.  It is thus essential that 
the most profitable companies are also the most productive which is what happened 
in intense and fair competitive markets. Competition also forces companies to 
invest to keep up with operational best practices. 
The studies have shown that managers under intense competitive pressure are quick 
to find ways to go around labor market rigidities – e.g. Indian state-owned steel 
plants have relied on voluntary retirement schemes to reduce their excess labor.  
Competition is also forcing companies to invest in training their workers. 
Finally, international and local competitive pressure is what drives national and 
local governments (often under the pressure of the private sector) to address some 
of the investment climate issues in the exposed sectors – e.g. Andhra Pradesh 
reformed its power sector in part because its manufacturers were under increase 
pressure from imports following India’s reduction in import tariffs.  This is why 
lowering barriers to trade and FDI is probably the best way for countries to get 
started on the reform agenda.    
Unfortunately, most sectors are not exposed to international competition and many 
of the microeconomic policy issues affecting them never make it to the radar screen 
of reformers. For example, MGI showed that these overlooked micro policy issues 
cost India more than 3 percentage points of annual GDP growth (Figure 3).   
These GDP growth rate estimates are based on the generalization of very detailed 
industry level analysis to systematically identify and assess the factors leading to 
low investment and/or productivity (see the second section for a detailed 
presentation of the methodology).  Going back to the India example, MGI found in 
most sectors a wide labor productivity distribution between the average performer, 
the local best practice and what MGI estimated to be the viable potential given the 
prevailing factor costs.  Most of these productivity gaps could be traced back to 
micro policy issues distorting competition within India and/or shielding Indian 
companies from international best practices – the software sector being the 
exception confirming the rule (Figure 4).  
We group these overlooked micro policy issues into three categories: sector specific 
policy issues, land market issues and the unequal enforcement/informality trap.     7
Industry-Specific Policy Issues 
There are two main types of industry-specific policy issues:  a) industry policies 
restricting competition and investment; and b) poor attempts at policing quasi 
natural monopolies and social sectors.   
Sector policies restricting competition and investment 
   Restrictions on FDI.  Despite the growing consensus on the positive 
impact of FDI, most developing countries continue to forbid FDI in 
many sectors – e.g. no FDI allowed in the Indian retail sector.  MGI 
found that the impact of FDI is the strongest in sectors with intense and 
fair competition and strong inter-linkages with supplier and user 
industries. This is what happened in the Indian automotive sector where 
productivity more than tripled following the arrival of FDI.  Combined 
with increased competitive pressure, this led to rapidly declining prices 
resulting in output growing even faster with a net employment gain 
(Figure 5).  Policies that have attempted to force spillover effects from 
FDI such as local content and joint venture requirements have often 
proven counter-productive by restraining competition or leading to sub-
scale investments (e.g., the consumer electronic sector in India). 
   Other licensing restrictions.  Entry may be restricted to domestic 
investors as well.  India, for example continues to reserve the 
production of more than 600 manufacturing products to small-scale 
companies in the ill founded belief that it will be good for employment.  
In fact, this licensing regime cost India many jobs by preventing it to be 
competitive – e.g. against China in the apparel sector (figure 6).  The 
negative impact of licensing can be more subtle.  For example, agency 
laws in the Middle East prevent large productive retailers from 
negotiating discounts (justified by scale economies) with monopoly 
importers while small informal retailers rely on “parallel” imports to go 
around the fat margins of agents.  This results in these low-productivity 
retailers enjoying 15% lower cost of goods sold than their productive 
competitors – the reverse of a fair market outcome.  The removal of 
such restrictions has had dramatic positive impact on productivity and 
investments, e.g. the rise in competition and decline in prices occurring 
in the mobile telephony industry around the world.   8
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Figure 5.  Removal of Product Market Barriers Led to Dramatic Growth in 
the Indian Automotive Industry
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Figure 6.  Product Market Barriers Hamper the Efficiency of the Indian
Apparel Industry
Source: McKinsey Global Institute
Barriers
• Small-scale industry 
reservation in apparel and 
textile
• Non-level excise duties on 
textiles
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Figure 8. Impact of Tariff and Non-Tariff Trade Barriers on Prices 
Standard deviation of prices across the EU
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   Trade barriers (including non tariffs).  Like many others, MGI found 
many examples of the positive impact of lower trade barriers.  For 
example, labor productivity shot up in the Brazilian automotive 
industry after imports were allowed (Figure 7). Although most 
countries have been lowering their tariffs steadily, many non tariff trade 
barriers have popped up (e.g., cumbersome technical standards, custom 
and fiscal discrimination). It is non tariff trade barriers that limit cross 
country competition in the consumer good industries across ASEAN, 
resulting in very large price discrepancies (Figure 8). 
   Restrictions on prices, products and services.  Such restrictions often 
limit the capacity for more productive companies to compete on price 
and/or new services.  For example, pricing regulations in trucking have 
limited competition and productivity in Western Europe until they were 
dismantled by the EU.  short retail opening hours in Germany protect 
the low-productivity city center retailers from high- productivity 
suburban competitors.     
Poor attempts at policing quasi natural monopolies and social sectors – 
“The cure is often worse than the disease”. 
   Quasi-natural monopolies.  Up to 10% of a country’s economy 
consists of sectors that are quasi natural monopolies, in the sense that 
they require large one-off investment.  This is typically the case for 
large network infrastructure such as electricity distribution, local fixed 
telephony, oil pipelines, water distribution, roads and airports.  In such 
cases, intense competition can hardly be expected since it would lead to 
overcapacity and to huge financial losses for the new entrants.  The 
historical remedy to this problem has been government ownership and 
control of the assets.  This led to many well understood management/ 
governance problems that have been compounded by non economic 
pricing regulations (often in the pursuit of social objectives), often with 
detrimental economic effects.  Subsidized power and water prices have 
discouraged private investments due to a lack of trust in the 
government’s capacity to pay back the subsidy.  This has forced 
companies to rely on their own much more expensive generators and 
forced low-income households to rely on very expensive informal 
sources of water, while the rich households enjoy almost free water in 
central Mumbai.  Low telecom subscription fees to encourage access 
were compensated with    11
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Figure 10.  Bad Medicine for Japan’s Economy
Average hospital length of stay for acute care, 1996, days







call rates significantly above their marginal cost, resulting in very low 
network utilization.  In the case of Indian telecom, the government has set 
the prices so high that the Indian State-owned telecom operator is among 
the most profitable in the world despite its low productivity (Figure 9).   
   Social sectors.   Socially critical sectors such as health care, education 
and social housing construction represent up to 20% of a country’s 
economy.  Governments have also tended to own and regulate these 
“strategic” sectors with most often disastrous results.  World Bank 
research has shown that the lack of accountability of school masters in 
many Indian primary schools often results in teachers not even showing 
up for classes, and that the largest part of the government social 
programs ends up benefiting the middle and upper classes.  MGI 
research found that social housing schemes in Russia lead to low 
productivity but enable well connected developers to crowd out the 
new efficient firms.  Another example is the Japanese Government’s 
reimbursement scheme in health care, which gave an incentive to 
hospitals to keep their patients as long as possible, resulting in an 
average length of stay six times longer than in the US for the same 
disease (Figure 10).   
Land market issues.   
The economic performance of a large share of a country’s economy depends 
crucially on the conditions prevailing in its land market, e.g., the retail, 
construction, agriculture, hotels and restaurant sectors, and through spillover 
effects, the wholesale, construction materials and tourism sectors.  Land 
market issues include the following: 
   Restrictions on land ownership for foreigners.  Many countries (e.g., 
India and UAE) continue to impose severe restrictions on land 
ownership by foreigners.  This is particularly damaging in the retail and 
housing construction sectors where land appreciation is a critical 
component of the investments’ financial viability.  
   Low property taxes and user charges on utilities.  Actual property 
taxes and user charges are often very low.  This does not give local 
governments the financial means and incentives to develop new land – 
50% of local government revenues come from property taxes in the US.  
This was found to be the main reason that local governments in India 
were bankrupt and incapable of developing new land much beyond the 
1947 city limits.     13
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Figure 11.  Small Stores Are Big in Japan
Share of total hours worked in retailing sector, percent
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   Difficult access to government land.  A large extent of prime land 
remains in the hands of the government or government-owned 
companies.  For example, in Russia, MGI found that prime government 
land is allocated to friendly business interests in the retail and housing 
construction sectors through less than transparent mechanisms. 
   Restrictive zoning laws.  Zoning laws restricting large modern 
retailers are quite common.  For example, in Japan, zoning laws are the 
reason that half of the employment in the food retail sector is still in 
low-productivity Mom-and-Pop stores (Figure 11). 
   Land-related administrative barriers.  MGI and FIAS found in most 
developing countries multiple layers of land-related administrative red 
tape to be a major impediment to investments and productivity growth 
because they lead to multiple delays and inefficiencies. 
   Unsecured property rights.  Last but not least, unclear land titles 
combined with unreliable courts limit the supply of land and discourage 
investments.  Southern States in India enjoy much higher land tenure 
security than the Northern States.  This is the main reason for why land 
market prices are lower and the share of modern retailers is much 
higher in Southern Indian states (Figure 12). 
Unequal enforcement of policies and the informality trap.   
This is probably the biggest and least understood impediment to economic 
development.  Furthermore, this issue tends to get worse as developing 
country governments keep adding more fiscal and regulatory burdens on 
companies while their enforcement capacity and governance remain largely 
inadequate.  Informal companies operate fully or partially outside the formal 
fiscal and legal environment; they tend to be subscale, subinvested and 
subskilled; and they also tend to produce substandard products and services.  
Informality has two dire and related economic consequences.  First, and this 
is increasingly being recognized, it creates a trap from which it is very 
difficult to escape.  Many companies have no choice but to be informal 
because they cannot afford the tremendous cost of becoming formal (e.g., 
formalizing land property rights typically takes more than 100 administrative 
steps).  This results in valuable human and capital resources being stranded 
in subscale operations with little access to financing.  Second, it distorts the 
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Figure 14.  Low Productivity Performance of Large Informal Players
Percent of U.S. productivity
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which are on average more than three times less productive than formal ones 
(Figure 13).   
   According to the World Bank and the OIT (Organisation Internationale 
du Travail), informality typically affects around 40% of the non-
agricultural workforce in middle income countries – this proportion 
rises to 70% and above in lower income countries. 
   The problem is actually getting worse in most countries as governments 
keep increasing the fiscal and regulatory burden on companies – often 
to meet the requirements of the international financial institutions and 
international treaties (e.g., stricter standards on safety and intellectual 
property rights).  Brazil, for example, has increased its tax burden from 
24% to 30% of GDP over the last ten years in an attempt to stabilize its 
public finances.  The result has been that informality has increased 
from 40% to 50% of the non-agricultural workforce during that period.   
   The rise and negative economic impact of informality goes a long way 
in explaining the “Washington Paradox”, i.e., why the economic 
performance of most developing countries remained disappointing in 
the 1990s despite significant progress in implementing 
recommendations of the “Washington Consensus”.  In its country 
studies, the MGI estimated that informality was costing developing 
countries between one and two percentage points in annual GDP 
growth.  An indirect hint of the significant negative economic impact of 
informality is the fact that the few countries that became rich (e.g. 
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea as well as the Western 
democracies) never suffered from a serious informality problem (more 
on this later).  
   Informality is not confined to micro enterprises.  A large segment of the 
informal sectors consists of medium-size and sometimes large-size 
companies that manage to evade all or part of their regulatory and fiscal 
obligations, most often through connections with high-level 
government officials.  Such large informal companies can thus out-
compete their formal adversaries despite being much less productive 
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   There are multiple sources of informality and the way it plays out 
varies significantly by sector (Figure 15): 
–  Land market regulations.  Land market informality has two 
consequences.  First it gives a very important competitive advantage 
to the informal companies operating on cost-free land, which is 
critical in the retail, hotels, restaurant and housing construction 
sectors.  Second, it prevents the users of informal land from 
borrowing against it.  Most of the lending to small and medium-size 
enterprises is done using real estate as the collateral, even in the US 
today.  Hernando De Soto, who has explained the latter effect very 
well, has also documented in great detail how land informality 
issues stem from red tape in the land markets.  In the Philippines, for 
example, De Soto estimated that legalizing informal land takes 168 
administrative steps with 53 different public and private agencies, 
and takes between 13 and 25 years (“The Mystery of Capital”).  
–  Labor rules.  Most developing countries have put in place relatively 
generous social security provision and labor rules.  The problem is 
that these obligations are only met by the public sector and best 
practice formal companies who can afford them, while most workers 
enjoy no protections whatsoever in the informal sector.  The worst 
case is Brazil, where half of the social security contributions paid by 
formal companies is used to pay the deficit of the generous public 
pension system. 
–  Energy provided by the government.  Non-payment of energy 
(e.g., electricity and gas) is a critical issue in sectors such as steel 
and cement that are heavy users of energy.  This is the reason that 
obsolete and subscale plants survived in Russia and India.  Non-
enforcement of energy liabilities is a major source of implicit 
industrial subsidy – it costs the Indian government 1.5% of GDP. 
–  Sector specific policies.  We have already mentioned the case of 
Middle Eastern merchants who were able to go around the fat 
margins of monopolist import agents by relying on “parallel” 
imports.  Evasion of import tariffs and product standards has also 
been an issue in the retail, food processing, auto part, consumer 
electronic and software sectors.  For example, uneven and non-
transparent sanitary standards favor informality in the Argentinean 
meat-processing sector (Figure 16).     19
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Figure 18.  Advantages of Tax Evasion in Single-Family Housing in 
Argentina
* These assumptions are related to the common industry practice of paying the workers a declared income equal 
to the minimum agreed salary and with the high level of evasion observed in the other taxes
Source:McKinsey
Sale price = 100
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In other cases, the government is imposing too strict safety and 
health standards given the economic development of the country, 
e.g., it would be safer for Indian families to drive in cheaper cars 
with relaxed safety standards than to be forced to transport the 
whole family on the motorcycle.  The imposition of rich country 
product standards thus often results in a dual market segmentation – 
developing country consumers are often left with the choice between 
quality but expensive products and services, and low quality 
informal products, which are still relatively expensive because they 
are produced through informal methods.  Lower product market 
standards and trade barriers between developing markets would 
make it more attractive and cost effective to design and produce 
products and services specifically targeted at low-income 
consumers.  This lagging opportunity is evidenced by the fact that 
South South FDI is increasing rapidly enabling the development and 
spread of low spec products produced with state of the art methods – 
e.g. Chinese companies know how to produce $50 TVs in Vietnam.  
–  Taxes.  Last but not least, tax related informality affects most 
industries and can lead to a very significant cost advantage.  Retail 
and housing construction have been among the sectors most affected 
by tax related informality.  For example, Russian open wholesale 
markets enjoy 20% lower prices than supermarkets by evading most 
of their tariff and tax obligations (Figure 17); and unequal tax 
enforcement favors low productivity players in the Argentinean 
construction sector (Figure 18). 
As discussed earlier, the tax burden on formal companies is high and 
getting higher.  Developing countries typically collect more than 
25% of GDP in taxes, and about 80% of these taxes are collected 
from formal companies as VAT, corporate and labor taxes.  Personal 
and property tax collection is usually very small.  Developed 
countries typically also have a tax burden of around 30% of GDP, 
but only half is collected from companies.  Furthermore, this tax 
burden increased slowly over time, giving developed countries the 
time to develop effective tax administrations.  The tax burden on the 
economy was less than 10% of GDP when developed countries were 
at the economic development level of Brazil today.  The reasons that 
the tax burden is so much higher today include high interest 
































Figure 19. High Fiscal Burden Due to Ineffective Government Programs
Total government expenditures as % of GDP
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programs, large spending on defense, large spending on government 
administration, large amount of explicit or implicit industrial 
subsidies, large amounts spent on social security and large amount 
of illicit appropriations.  Japan has shown that large public 
investments could be made in education, health care and 
infrastructure with a reasonable tax burden (Figure 19).  
The higher the tax and regulatory burden, the less likely the government 
administration and courts are going to be capable or even willing to enforce the 
rules on every company.  The problem is made worse by lack of resources, lack 
of skills, poor organization (e.g., no specialized commercial judges) and by the 
lack of transparency and accountability leading to corruption in the government 
and judiciary.  The first step in reducing informality has to be reducing the 
regulatory and fiscal burden. 
 
Addressing these microeconomic issues will also contribute to resolving 
macroeconomic issues (Figure 20).  For example, reform of the electricity sector 
in India would enable the federal government to reduce its budget deficit by one 
and a half percentage points of GDP, which is the amount currently paid to State 
governments to compensate for the 40% of the electricity not paid for. 
II. METHODOLOGY OF THE McKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE 
These findings are based on the systematic analysis of the barriers to productivity 
and investment growth in a representative sample of sectors for each studied 
country.   
The focus is on productivity and investment because they are the key engines to 
economic growth.  The productivity level at which the labor and capital inputs are 
put to work is the primary driver of GDP per capita. 
In effect, every time a company increases its productivity, it generates an economic 
surplus, which can then be redistributed to consumers in the form of better products 
and/or lower prices, to employees in the form of higher salaries and/or to investors 
in the form of higher profits to be reinvested by the most productive companies.   
Most of the work is conducted at the economic sector level because the relative 
importance of factors can only be firmly established at the microeconomic level, 
where causality links can be conclusively determined.  It is also only at the sector 
level that deeply buried micro policy issues can be identified and analyzed.   23
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Figure 21.  Methodology and Information Sources for Sector Analysis
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
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Conducting Industry Level Analysis 
The barriers to higher productivity and investments are analyzed for each sector 
through a four-step process, which relies on extensive data gathering and company 
interviews (Figure 21). 
¶  Assessing productivity performance.  The first step consists of 
measuring the productivity performance gaps between the studied country 
and relevant benchmark countries for the sector under investigation.  It 
starts with a comparison of the labor productivity levels complemented, 
for the capital intensive sectors, by a comparison of the capital 
productivity levels.  The level of productivity growth is estimated to assess 
whether the studied country is rapidly closing its productivity gaps – 
which would typically be the case if the barriers to productivity growth 
had been recently removed.  A “physical” definition of productivity was 
used, i.e., the number of hours of work needed to assemble a car (adjusted 
for quality and differences in vertical integration), moving away from 
measures based on financial data, which in most cases prevent meaningful 
international comparisons in the absence of value–added, purchasing 
power parity exchange rates.  In many sectors, especially for developing 
countries, the lack of reliable sector level statistics made it necessary to 
estimate productivity levels through interviews/surveys of a sample of 
representative companies.  In India, for example, MGI had to interview 
614 companies.  Actual productivity levels are benchmarked between 
countries using output (physical measures adjusted for quality or value 
added adjusted using purchasing power parities) and input (hours worked, 
units of physical capital) measures.  The methodologies used to measure 
service sector outputs were first developed in the context of industrial 
countries before being adapted to developing countries.  The detailed 
methodologies used are discussed in the appendices of the sector case 
studies (see www.mckinsey.com/mgi).     
¶  Understanding the operational reasons for the productivity gaps.  The 
second step consists of explaining the productivity level gaps at the 
operational level.  The productivity gaps are systematically allocated 
between all factors of production, i.e., level of capital investments, scale of 
operations, modes of organization, labor skills, supplier relations, 
product/service quality, etc.  For developing countries in particular, the 
share of the labor productivity gap, explained by the fact that the cost of 
labor is cheaper relative to capital when compared to developed countries, 
is carefully calculated.  This is the reason that managers in the Indian 
wheat milling sector, for example, unlike their US counterparts, do not   25
automate packaging.  The economics literature typically expects this effect 
to be the dominant explanation of the productivity gaps – the MGI found it 
to be relatively unimportant, even in a country with very low labor costs 
such as India (Figure 4).  This analytical step defines the productivity 
potential/ frontier for each sector of the studied country, taking into 
account factor cost differences.  The productivity difference between the 
actual productivity level and the productivity potential/frontier is the gap 
managers should be able to fill. The next two analytical steps discussed  
below identify why that has not happened. We first discuss in more detail 
how the operational gap analysis has been conducted.   
   Assessing productivity performance by type of players, starting 
with the local best practice.  The most effective way of conducting 
this analysis is to identify and interview the likely best practice 
companies (i.e., companies with the highest levels of total factor 
productivity) in the sector within the country under study. These 
companies are typically easy to identify (e.g., large subsidiary of best 
practice multinational).  Using quantitative analysis and extensive 
interviews, the first step is to establish productivity level of the local 
best practice players as compared with international best practice.  The 
next step is to understand the operational reasons for these productivity 
gaps through expert interviews and plant visits.  A similar process was 
followed to explain the productivity gaps between the local best 
practice firms and the local average. The best practice firms usually 
have a very good perspective on the nature of their operational 
advantages against local competitors, which can then be confirmed 
through additional interviews with average local companies.     
   Conducting analysis and interviews.  Local best practice firms tend 
to be relatively easy to access and engage because the findings are 
likely to serve their interest, and because they tend to be naturally 
interested in understanding how their productivity compares with 
international best practice as well as with their local competitors.  They 
are also a great source of information on the external factors limiting 
their productivity and/or limiting them from expanding/putting 
competitive pressure on their less productive local competitors.  This is 
not true of the average-firm managers, who tend to blame their poor 
productivity on everything but themselves, e.g., the workers have poor 
skills, the infrastructure is terrible and the taxes are too high.  This 
benchmarking approach sorts these things out, i.e., why does the 
company next door, confronted with the same infrastructure issues and   26
recruiting from the same labor pool, manage three times higher 
productivity levels? 
¶  Assessing competitive pressure.  The third step is the analysis of the 
sector’s competitive dynamics and the extent to which they put managers 
under pressure to reach their productivity potential.  The extent to which 
companies at different levels of productivity compete with each other is 
determined, as well as the extent to which the competition is fair.  For 
example, to what extent are domestic incumbents exposed to global best 
practice companies, whether through trade or foreign direct investments.  
Other symptoms of competitive intensity are analyzed beyond manager 
interviews, which can be very subjective if not misleading (managers tend 
to overestimate the extent to which they compete).  These include shifts in 
market shares, the degree to which there are new entrants as well as 
companies exiting or going bankrupt, evidence of price-based competition 
and profitability levels.  This is a crucial analytical step since most 
managers take significant corrective actions with respect to their 
company’s productivity performance only if they are under the threat of 
financial losses/bankruptcy brought about from having to compete (fairly) 
with significantly more productive competitors.   
¶  Assessing the importance of external factors in explaining managers’ 
behavior and companies’ poor productivity.  The last step reaps the 
fruits of the hard won findings from the first three steps.  It consists of 
systematically linking the factors in the external environment of 
companies (e.g., labor and capital market regulations, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic conditions, etc.) to the different types of operational 
deficiencies that build up to the overall productivity gaps.  These external 
factors can lead to lower productivity either directly (e.g., labor rules 
preventing lay-offs equally enforced on all type of companies) or by 
preventing full and fair competition with global best practice companies 
(e.g., ban on foreign direct investment in the Indian retail sector).  Sector-
specific policy issues have been found to be by far the most important 
external factors.  This is because weak competitive environment 
conditions were the most important reason that managers are not “pushed” 
to reach their productivity potential – and sector-specific regulatory issues 
typically are, among all external factors, the key determinant of 
competitive conditions (e.g., entry barriers in the form of import tariffs or 
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sanitary regulations favoring the local low productivity incumbents in 
Argentina’s meat processing sector).  In Brazil, housing construction 
developers were blaming their poor productivity performance on the low 
education level of their workers.   MGI informed them that housing 
construction companies in Houston, Texas were achieving best practice 
productivity levels with illiterate ex agricultural workers from Mexico 
(Figure 22).   
In short and not surprisingly, the last thing most managers will mention 
are the sector-specific policy issues that shield them from having to 
compete on equal terms with more productive companies. 
Synthesizing the Findings across Sectors   
Country-wide conclusions can be derived from the analysis of productivity barriers 
across a representative sample of economic sectors combined with a few targeted 
aggregate analyses.  It is possible to derive rough estimates of what would be the 
additional economic growth such reforms would yield as well as to identify the 
employment sensitivities of such reforms.  These aggregate analyses, combined 
with the sector-specific finding, are invaluable in helping governments set priorities 
(e.g., in Russia, Korea and India), convince a critical mass of reform opponents and 
identify the areas/sectors where targeted demand side social policies will be the 
most needed to accompany the economic reforms.  
These estimates, grounded on a comprehensive microeconomic fact base, are 
fundamentally different from classic macroeconomic projections, which have been 
proven wrong more often than not and as a result largely discredited.  For example, 
traditional macroeconomic projections typically assume a constant evolution in the 
capital to output ratio combined with some forecast of future investment levels.  
These analyses fail to recognize the potential that exists in most developing 
countries for very significant increases in capital productivity that would take place 
if companies were subject to full competitive forces.  They also fail to identify the 
key microeconomic drivers of investment growth, which are fundamentally related 
to the drivers of productivity growth.  Finally they ignore the fact that 
microeconomic reforms would have a large positive effect in helping governments 
improve macroeconomic conditions and overall investment levels by improving the 
fiscal balances. 
The key analytical steps of the overall approach followed to move from sector 
specific conclusions to economy wide implications are as follow (Figure 23):   29
¶  The first step is to estimate the impact of removing productivity barriers 
on future labor and capital productivity growth for each of the studied 
sectors.  This is done by analyzing what happened in other countries that 
went through similar sectoral reforms (e.g., how fast modern retail formats 
grew in Thailand, Poland and China after the opening of their retail sectors 
to foreign retailers). 
¶  The next step is to extrapolate these findings to the other non-studied 
sectors based on microeconomic analogies.  For example, the findings 
from the retail sector can be extrapolated to the wholesale, restaurants and 
hotel sectors.  Similarly, the findings from the steel sector can be 
extrapolated to most heavy manufacturing sectors such as cement or 
aluminum. This allows us to estimate the overall economy wide 
productivity growth potential and to identify the key reforms necessary for 
overall productivity growth. 
¶  Reforms in the labor market may also be necessary to increase labor 
inputs.  For example, MGI estimated that France could increase its labor 
inputs by 1% a year by increasing the incentives for people to work. 
¶  Since the key aggregate constraint for developing countries is the overall 
level of private business investments, it is also necessary to understand by 
how much investment levels could increase from removing the barriers to 
sector level productivity growth, as well as from additional reforms in the 
capital markets needed to increase savings and efficiency of capital 
allocation between sectors and companies.  For example, MGI estimates 
showed that in India, removing the micro barriers to productivity growth 
would allow the government to quickly balance the budget (allowing 
domestic private investment to increase by 4% of GDP) and attract an 
additional 2% of GDP in foreign direct investments. MGI also found that 
widespread increases in competition together with the privatization of the 
banking system and capital intensive utility sectors would increase capital 
productivity in India by more than 50%.  These estimates for investment 
and capital productivity growth yielded for India a 7% GDP/capita growth 
potential (as compared with 3% currently).  
¶  So the combination of capital productivity and investment growth 
estimates yields a GDP growth potential for developing countries.  In the 
case of developed countries, the GDP growth potential is derived from the 
labor productivity and employment growth estimates. 
¶  There are a few other important aggregate constraints to test for in the 
case of developing countries.  As was the case for investments, MGI found   30
that even in India and Brazil, removal of the sector level productivity 
barriers would go a very long way in accommodating these aggregate 
constraints.  The first constraint entails an estimate of the future 
investment requirements in infrastructure needed to accommodate the 
growth potential.  The second is an analysis of the future evolution in the 
balance of trade taking into consideration higher export potential due to 
higher productivity (e.g., the apparel sector in India) as well as increased 
import requirements on machines and equipment to sustain the higher 
investment levels.  The third constraint analysis is an estimate of the 
aggregate demand for workers with higher degrees of education.  This is 
based on a detailed understanding of the skills required to achieve the 
productivity potential in each sector studied.  These analysis did increase 
the relative overall importance of infrastructure, labor and capital markets 
but, surprisingly, sector level microeconomic reforms remained at the top 
of the list for all the developing countries studied.  
Finally, these in-depth microeconomic analyses of sectors, combined with top-down 
country-level benchmarking, can give important insights into employment issues.  
Given the estimate of the overall GDP/capita growth potential, it is possible to 
derive sector-specific output growth.  Although this seems like an impossible task 
given the complex web of interactions that link one sector’s output to another’s 
(what economists refer to as general equilibrium effects), MGI found a way to crack 
through this problem by relying on the natural experiment of countries at different 
stages in their economic development.  This is based on the observation that 
regardless of race, religion or culture, consumers tend to follow similar 
consumption patterns as income grows.  So, for a given country, economists can 
map sectoral growth by observing what happened in countries further ahead in their 
economic development.  Sector-specific labor productivity growth estimates can 
then be combined with these sector-specific output growth estimates to shed new 
light on the future evolution of employment for each economic sector.   
As we move from the microeconomic diagnostic of a sample of industries to 
making economy wide recommendations, it is thus very important to take into 
account general equilibrium effects.  The good news is that finding ways to improve 
total factor productivity in a given sector is always a good thing for the economy 
because it generates a surplus that can then be redistributed.  The argument should 
be on how to redistribute it, as opposed to how to create it.  In theory at least, it 
should always be possible to use part of this surplus to address some of the social 
issues that might result from productivity growth.  This should be done without 
overly distorting the markets, e.g., through targeted demand side social policies.   31
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Figure 24.  Summary of Micro-Policy Issues
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Figure 25.  Unintended Consequences of Supply Side Social Policies
Micro policy issues  Social intentions 
Unintended 
consequences  Solution 
   Restriction to FDI/ 
tariffs/quotas 
   Protect national 
champions 
   Protect existing jobs 
   National champions 
becoming hopelessly non 
competitive 
   Net loss of output and 
eventually jobs 
   Remove restrictions 
   Support workers not 
companies 
   Non enforcement of laws 
on informal players 
   “Give a break to the poor”     Lock the poor into the 
informality trap 
   Reduce requirements to 
become legal 
   Legalize informal 
companies and workers 
   Improve enforcement 
   High minimum wage     Increase income of low-
skilled 
   Trap them in 
unemployment and/or 
informality 
   Earned income tax credit 
   Small-scale reservation      Create jobs in 
manufacturing 
   Underdeveloped sector 
because not competitive 
in export markets 
   Remove restriction  
   User charge subsidies on 
water 
   Make water available to 
everybody 
   No investment in water 
services 
   “Charge for it” 
   State financing of 
university education  
   Provide university 
education to the poor 
   Subsidize university 
education of the rich 
   Starve primary education 
of much needed 
resources 
   Raise tuition  
   Provide need-based 
grants and loans for low 
income students 
   Low telecom subscription 
fee and high call charges 
   Provide telecom access to 
poor people 
   Low network utilization 
especially by the poor 
   Economic pricing 
   Subscription subsidiary 
for the poor 
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CONCLUSION 
Micro policy issues affecting competition have proven to be, collectively, the 
biggest barriers to economic growth in all the developing countries studied by MGI.  
These policy issues come in many different shapes and forms (Figure 24). 
Most developing countries are only slowly improving their microeconomic policies, 
while enforcement/informality tends to get worse.     
So why is so little progress being made on these critical microeconomic issues?  An 
important reason is that governments do not realize that collectively these issues are 
the most important barriers to growth.  They also often do not realize that many of 
these market distortions, left in place in the name of social objectives, more often 
than not lead to much worse social outcomes and/or that there are more market 
friendly methods of conducting social policies (Figure 25).   
Finally, attached to each market distortion, there is inevitably a strong vested 
interest that will lobby hard for the status quo.  Although it may not be enough, 
experience has shown that the public disclosure of such sector level analysis can go 
a long way in stimulating countries to reform.  This is what happened in the case of 
restricting FDI in the Indian retail sector.  Detailed sector level analysis was 
necessary to dispel three misconceptions the Indian government had about retail and 
to initiate a serious debate on the issue.  First, the analysis showed that modern 
retail formats were not only catering to the rich – the price of basic food products 
would be cheaper in best practice supermarkets if taxes were enforced equally 
across formats.  Second, letting in best practice (foreign) retailers would not result 
in a reduction in employment – employment in the retail sector has increased in 
every country studied, together with the share of productive modern formats 
because retail consumption increased faster than productivity.  Finally, the retail 
sector is not an unimportant low-tech economic sector – retail accounts for more 
than 10% of GDP and sophisticated retailers are forcing operational improvements 
among wholesalers and suppliers as well as becoming export channels in their own 
right (e.g. Tesco in Thailand and Wal-Mart in Brazil).  The Indian government 
announced in February 2005 that it will authorize FDI in retail. 
Governments and international financial institutions should thus leverage much 
more industry level analysis to identify and remove the microeconomic binding 
constraints to product market competition and, thus, to economic growth.        
*** 